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Abstract
The terrorist attacks of September 11
th 2001 have led to increases in both public and private
spending on security. This article contains an estimate of the likely effects that these increased
security measures will have on the economy. Since current proposals are to devote only a very small
part of total resources to homeland security, the effect of homeland security on the economy will
probably be relatively small.
In particular, the proposed increased government spending on homeland security does not evaporate
the peace-dividend of the 1990’s. Even when one adds homeland security spending to the defense
budget, the proposed defense budget makes up a smaller fraction of GDP than in any year in
between 1947-1995. Furthermore, the estimates presented here suggest that homeland security
efforts in the private sector will permanently lower productivity levels in the business sector by
about 1.12% for labor productivity and 0.63% for multifactor productivity.
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* The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, nor those of the
Federal Reserve System.2
1. Introduction
Increases in spending on security measures are on the agenda of both the government as well as of
many firms in the private sector. These increases in security expenditures will undoubtedly have an
impact on the economy. If firms end up spending significant amounts of time and money on the
protection of their businesses then this will reduce their overall productivity. Furthermore, if the
governments’ spending on homeland security ends up being large then this might crowd out the
private sector from capital and labor markets. This will lead to an increase in the cost of capital as
well as wages, reducing investment and employment. Finally, the homeland security efforts might
have many indirect effects on the economy, like the costs of increased airport waiting times, and
long-run productivity effects through a reallocation of R&D spending.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the likely magnitude of the effect of the homeland security
efforts, of both the public and private sectors, on the economy. The focus here will be on the costs
of homeland security. From that perspective, the analysis here can be interpreted as the cost-side of
a cost-benefit analysis. In order to estimate the costs, I will focus on three main questions.
The first question addresses the likely magnitude of the government expenditures on homeland
security. In order to answer this question, I review the historical as well as proposed expenditures
on homeland security by the federal, state and local governments and compare them with historical
spending levels on other programs and items.
The second question considers whether firms will spend significant amounts of time and money
on security and protection. To get an insight in this issue, I estimate the share of inputs that firms
used to devote to protective services before 2001. I will then consider the effect that doubling this
share would have on their productivity levels. This is a scenario that is similar to the one used by
the Council of Economic Advisers (2002) to assess the productivity effect of homeland security.
The final question is how big the many indirect effects of homeland security are. The answer to
this question turns to be the most speculative of the three. Of the many possible indirect effects, I
will deal in detail with two in particular. The costs due to increased waiting times at airports, the
possible effect on long-run productivity growth due to a shift in R&D expenditures.
In practice, it turns out to be hard to classify which expenditures are ‘homeland security’ related.
For this reason, I will use a definition of homeland security that is as broad as possible. This broad
definition is ‘all expenditures that are possibly aimed at either preventing damage due to terrorist
attacks or at preparedness for the response to possible terrorist attacks’. Because of this broad
definition, the estimates presented here should be preferably interpreted as estimates of the
maximum effect of homeland security on the economy.
The results suggest that, in spite of this broad definition, the amounts of spending involved are
relatively small. Consequently, the reallocation of resources due to homeland security is unlikely to
have any large and long lasting effects on the economy. In particular, the proposed increased
spending on homeland security does not evaporate the peace dividend of the 1990’s. Even when one
adds homeland security spending to the defense budget, the proposed defense budget makes up a3
smaller fraction of GDP than in any year in between 1947-1995. Furthermore, the homeland
security efforts in the private sector will lower labor productivity levels in the business sector by
about 1.12%. At 2001 input and productivity levels, this 1.12% drop in labor productivity would
reduce business sector output by about $70 billion.4
2. Public spending on homeland security
The term ‘Homeland Security’ was only formally introduced after the September 11
th 2001 terrorist
attacks. However, before September 2001 the federal government was already spending money on
several terrorism related programs. Many of these programs span several departments. In 1995 the
National Security Council was assigned the task of coordinating these programs and the Office of
Management and Budget was assigned to supervise the programs’ budgetary aspects. In practice,
however, most departments did not specifically account for expenditures as being ‘terrorism related’
until 1998. The most comprehensive study of Federal funding of anti-terrorism programs before
1998 is the General Accounting Office’s (1997) report. The 1998 National Defense Authorization
Act requires the Administration to provide an annual report on the funding of programs to combat
terrorism. Since 1998 the Office of Management and Budget has provided Congress with an annual
overview of terrorism related expenditures, which include funds to combat terrorism, to prepare for
a response to weapons of mass destruction, and to protect critical infrastructure
1.
Figure 1 presents the federal government’s expenditures on combating terrorism for fiscal years
1996-2001 and on homeland security for 2002 and 2003 as a percentage of GDP. In the six years
before the terrorist attacks the government spent about one tenth of a percent of GDP on its anti-
terrorism program.
Right before September
2001 the approved spending on
combating terrorism was $12
billion for the 2002 fiscal year,
which would have been about
0.1% of GDP again. As a
response to the terrorist attacks
Congress supplemented the
budget and ended up allowing
the Administration to spend
approximately $20 billion on
homeland security.
The President’s current
budget sets aside $38 billion for
homeland security expenses for
the 2003 fiscal year
2. According
                                                
1 After September 11
th 2001, the Office of Homeland Security was established by Executive Order to develop and coordinate the
federal homeland security program. The ‘National Homeland Security and Combatting Terrorism Act’, introduced in May 2002,
calls for the establishment of a formal Department of National Homeland Security at cabinet level.
2 Taken from the February 4, 2002, budget proposal
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Figure 1. Homeland security expenditures as a percentage of GDP
source: General Accounting Office (1997), Office of Management and
Budget (2001), Congressional Budget Office (2002), Bureau of
Economic Analysis (NIPA-data)
note: fiscal years run from fourth quarter – through the third quarter, 1996
and 1997 data taken form GAO (1997)  while 1998-2001 taken from
OMB (2001). Projections for 2002 and 2003 taken from House
Budget Committee and White House press releases. GDP projections
for 2002 and 2003 are taken from the Congressional Budget Office
(2002) testimony.5
to the projections of the Congressional
Budget Office (2002) this would be 0.35%
of GDP. Consequently, in response to the
terrorist attacks the Federal government has
tripled the share of its homeland security
efforts in GDP.
How large are homeland security
expenditures relative to other budget items?
There are many budget items that homeland
security could in principle be compared
with. The most illustrative comparison is
that to defense expenditures. A big concern,
see for example BusinessWeek (2001) and
Bailey (2001), is that the additional
expenditures on homeland security will
erase the peace dividend of the 1990’s in the
sense that it will push defense expenditures
back to their Cold War levels and will force
the federal government to run large budget deficits. Of the $38 billion that the Administration plans
to spend on homeland security in the 2003 fiscal year, $7.8 billion is part of the defense budget. The
proposed total defense budget for 2003 equals $379 billion and will be about 3.5% of GDP. Hence,
if one would add the additional $30 billion in non-defense homeland security spending to the
defense budget, then homeland security expenditures and national defense outlays would account
for about 3.8% of GDP. As one can see from Figure 2, this would be about the same as the share of
national defense outlays in 1995, and still lower than in any year in the 1947-1994 period. Hence,
the concern that the homeland security efforts will erase the peace dividend of the 1990’s seems to
be unfounded, at least for the currently proposed spending levels.
The Administration plans to spend its homeland security budget on five main objectives. These
are (i) the support of first responders in the preparation for future terrorist threats, (ii) the
improvement of the U.S.’s response to biological terrorism, (iii) the improvement of border
controls, (iv) the tightening of aviation security, and (v) the enhancement of the sharing of
information on potential terrorist suspects
3. Figure 3 depicts how the Administration divided the
2003 budget between these objectives. One has to bear in mind that many of these objectives
involve significant subsidies to state and local governments to support them in the preparation for
and the prevention of future possible terrorist attacks.
                                                
3 In their study for the Brookings Institution, O’Hanlon et. al. (2002) advice to pursue a slightly broader homeland security agenda
which would increase federal spending on homeland security to between $45 billion and $50 billion annually.
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Figure 2. share of national defense outlays in GDP
note: Shaded area is defense outlays as a percentage of GDP.
Solid line is the 3.8% percent of GDP which is the share of
the combined defense and homeland security budgets in
2002.6
The overall expenditures that state
and local governments will incur due to
increased security measures in response
to the September 11
th 2001 terrorist
attacks are less transparent than those of
the federal government. This lack of
transparency could be a source of delays
in local security efforts, as the New York
Times (Dec. 10, 2001) already noted.
Though we do not know what state and
local governments will end up spending
on homeland security, we do know what
they expect to spend. Two surveys
related to these expenditures, by the
National Governors Association and the
U.S. Conference of Mayors, were held in
December 2001 and January 2002
respectively.
The survey by the National
Governors Association suggests that state governments expect the costs of homeland security for
2002 to be as high as $4 billion. Of this total, $3 billion would be needed for improving emergency
communications systems and bioterrorism preparations, while the other $1 billion would be used for
critical infrastructure protection. The survey by the U.S. Conference of Mayors indicates that
additional security costs for all cities with a population of 30.000 people and higher could be as
high as $2.1 billion for 2002
4. As a matter of comparison, the current forecast of the City of New
York is that it will spend $3.8 billion on the New York Police Department in 2002
5.
Thus, combining the results of these surveys yields the preliminary estimate that the total cost of
homeland security efforts on a state and local level is about $6.1 billion. However, there is a large
overlap between these $6.1 billion and the federal homeland security budget.
The federal homeland security budget includes $4.8 billion in support of local first responders
and bioterrorism preparedness. Consequently, the net expenditures of state and local governments
on homeland security will likely be about $1.3 billion, which would be a very small expense when
compared to the $1276 billion in state and local government expenditures in 2001. Furthermore, in
the future the additional security expenditures of state and local governments might be expected to
                                                
4 The U.S. Conference of Mayors notes that this estimate is still preliminary, pointing out that this is a revised estimate, published in
January 2002, of an earlier estimate of $1.5 billion for 2002 as well as the last three months of 2001, published in October 2001.
This revision was necessitated because their January survey suggested that cities had already spent more than half a billion dollars
on additional homeland security measures in the period from September 11
th 2001 through January 1 2002.
5 See Office of Management and Budget of the City of New York (2002)
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Figure 3. Composition of 2003 homeland security budget7
be lower, because their initial expenditures are largely composed of one-time investments in the
necessary equipment. In fact, the survey by the U.S. Conference of Mayors suggests that 50% of the
additional security expenditures by cities are capital expenditures.
Consequently, homeland security expenditures are relatively small compared to other
government programs. Thus, if one argues that in response to September 11
th 2001 fiscal discipline
should have a high priority, as Bailey (2001) does, then one does not have to be concerned with
homeland security expenditures being a major threat to the budget.
Finally, one might want to ask how the United States’ expenditures on combating terrorism
compare to similar expenditures in other industrialized countries? Unfortunately, this question turns
out to be hard to answer because, just like in the U.S. before 1998, most countries do not separately
account for their counter terrorism expenditures.8
3. Private sector spending on security
Beside an expansion of the public sector, the other concern is that, in order to protect themselves,
firms will decide to devote a large part of their time and resources to protective activities rather than
productive activities. Such a shift in resources would raise unit production costs and lower
productivity. We cannot get an exact estimate of how much money and time firms will devote to
increased security. However, we can measure how much firms have spent in the past on security
measures. The aim of this section is to measure these expenditures and then consider the effect of a
hypothetical doubling of these resources on productivity.
There is no separate accounting of firms’ expenditures on security against terrorism
6. The
closest we can get to measuring these expenditures is to consider the much more general
classification of ‘protective services’. Box 1 contains a description of what parts of labor, capital,
and intermediate inputs are classified as ‘protective’. As can be seen from Box 1 protective
activities encompass much more than solely terrorism related security. They vary from fire
protection to the protection provided by crossing guards. This classification of all the protective
services inputs as homeland security related will mean that the results presented here are best
interpreted as an estimate of the maximum impact of homeland security efforts on the private
sector.
There are a few areas to which firms
might devote more resources in response to
the increased threat of terrorism that are not
included in the list of protective services
inputs. First of all, the capital measure only
includes electronic security systems and does
not include things like fencing. However,
Anderson’s (1999) study of the costs of
crime in the U.S. suggests that the value of
these additional types of capital is small
relative to that of the electronic security
systems included in the analysis. Secondly,
the data do not account for time spent by
non-protective services employees on
terrorism preparedness. Finally, the measures
of security related inputs used here do not
account for the increase in information
security measures that firms will take to
                                                
6 O’Hanlon et al. (2002) propose that the Bureau of Economic Analysis starts accounting for security related expenditures in its
National Income and Product Accounts.
Box 1. Protective activities in the private sector
•  Labor: Protective services occupations
Category 33 of Standard Occupational Classification.
Consists mainly of fire fighters, police officers,
correctional officers, private detectives, and security
guards.
(source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational
Employment Survey)
•  Capital: Electronic security systems
Electronic access control, anti-burglary, closed circuit
television, fire protection, systems integration, and home
automation.
(source: Security Industry Association of America
Research Update, Security Sales Magazine).
•  Services: Protective services industry
Comprises establishments primarily engaged in providing
one or more of the following: (1) investigation and
detective services, (2) guard and patrol services, (3)
picking up and delivering money, receipts, or other
valuable items with personnel and equipment to protect
such properties while in transit.
(source: Bureau of Economic Analysis input-output
tables)9
protect their computer networks and resources as well as the expenditures that firms occur by
investing in the establishment of both operational and informational backup sites.
Even though there is no direct evidence on these unaccounted inputs, there is some preliminary
evidence on them. In general, O’Hanlon et al. (2002) suggest that the total annual homeland
security cost for the private sector will be about $10 billion. This includes both the security
measures accounted for here as well as these unaccounted items. More specifically, the data
presented in RBC Capital Markets’ report in internet security suggest that before September 11
th
2001 prepackaged security software made up about 2% of firms’ software expenditures and that
security related computer equipment made up about 0.3% of total computer equipment
expenditures. Total internet security expenditures made up a larger part of inputs because these data
do not take into account expenditures on custom-made and in-house made software applications, as
well as personnel assigned to internet security related activities and computation time devoted to
software protection rather than to other applications.
In order to consider the importance of protective servants in private employment, we can look at
two measures. The first is to consider the fraction of workers employed as protective servants. Table
1, on page 21, shows that the 2000 share of protective servants in private employment
7 is about
1.12%. The approximately one million security guards account for about 80% of the protective
servants in the private sector. What is relevant for measuring the effect of these workers on
productivity, however, is not only their share in employment, but also their share in the total wage
bill. Since protective services employees tend to earn an hourly wage that is about 63% of the
average hourly wage, the share of protective servants in the total private wage bill is lower than
their share in total employment. To be precise, protective servants make up only 0.71% of the wage
bill. By comparison, lawyers make up only 0.32% of the labor force, but earn 0.96% of the wage
bill.
If businesses would have had to replace their capital stocks in 1999, then only about half a
percent of that replacement cost would have been spent on electronic security systems. Moreover,
of the part of output in 1999 that can be accounted for as being produced by the capital inputs, only
0.46% was produced by electronic security systems. In technical terms, this implies that the share of
electronic security systems in the total private capital service flows is 0.46%.
In order to get an estimate of the effect of homeland security on private sector productivity, the
rest of this section focuses on the scenario in which the private sector doubles the security related
capital and labor inputs on productivity
8. This is a similar scenario to the one considered by the
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA, 2002). The effect of such a scenario depends on what type of
productivity one considers. The Bureau of Labor Statistics measures two types of productivity. The
first is labor productivity measured as the amount of output produced per hour worked. The second
                                                
7 I use the terms ‘private employment’ and ‘business employment’ here interchangeably, because the data do not allow me to
distinguish between private and public enterprises.
8 If one would like to consider a tripling of these inputs, just like the federal government will approximately triple the share of GDP
devoted to homeland security, one can simply multiply the following results by one and a half.10
is multifactor productivity (MFP) and measures the amount of output produced per unit of input,
where a unit of input is measured as a combination of labor and capital. Box 2 contains an
explanation of the productivity concepts applied and productivity calculations performed here.
The calculations of the effect of homeland security on productivity assume that businesses
increase their inputs such that they double the resources devoted to their protective activities. These
inputs are assumed to be unproductive, however, in the sense that they do not lead to any measured
output. Table 2 lists the estimates of doubling the various inputs on both labor productivity as well
as MFP. All the effects that I present here are effects on the productivity level and not on its growth
rate.
Box 2. Calculation of productivity effects
The Bureau of Labor Statistics measures two types of productivity. Below an explanation of how homeland security
efforts can affect both of them
•  Notation and assumptions:
∆y Growth rate of output
∆l Growth rate of labor inputs
∆k Growth rate of capital inputs
The main assumption is that firms will double their security related capital and labor inputs while output levels will
remain the same. That is ∆y=0 while ∆l is the share of security related labor inputs in overall labor inputs and ∆k is
the share of electronic security systems in the total capital input level (capital service flows).
•  Labor productivity (ALP)
Definition:  Labor productivity is the amount of value added output produced per hour worked.
Effect: The growth rate of average labor productivity is the difference between the growth rate of output and
that of the labor input, i.e. ∆ALP=∆y-∆l. For the scenario considered here this implies that ∆ALP is
minus the share of security related labor inputs in the overall hours.
•  Multifactor productivity (MFP)
Definition: Multifactor productivity is the amount of output, measured as value added, produced per normalized
unit of inputs.
Units of inputs are measured as a combination of capital, i.e. equipment and structures, and labor.
Labor is measured in wage adjusted hours. The reason for the wage adjustment is the assumption that
workers that make twice as high a wage would also be twice as productive, which should be adjusted
for in accounting for the hours that they work.
Effect: The growth rate of multifactor productivity equals the growth rate of output minus a weighted average
of the growth rates of the capital and labor intputs, i.e. ∆MFP=∆y-w∆l-(1-w)∆k, where the weight w is
determined by the nominal output share of labor. For the scenario considered here this implies that
∆MFP= -w∆l-(1-w)∆k.
•  Multifactor productivity (capital, labor, energy, materials, and services) (MFP-KLEMS)
Definition: Amount of gross output produced per normalized unit of inputs.
Units of inputs are measured here as combination of capital, labor, energy, materials, and services. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics measures labor in this case in terms of hours worked.
Effect: Same as multifactor productivity with the additional effect that firms might also increase the business
services they buy to cover some of their security activities. Hence, in this case homeland security
measures affect productivity through the capital and labor input channels, as well as through business
services inputs.
Note:  The value added concept of output refers to total output minus the value of all the intermediate inputs a firm buys.
Please refer to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1997), chapters 10 and 11, for more details on productivity definitions and
statistics. Stiroh (2001) contains a more formal discussion of some of the terms involved.11
The largest productivity effect from doubling all security related labor inputs would be the
effect on labor productivity in the non-farm business sector. It would lower productivity by about
1.13%. The effect is lower for MFP because the MFP measure takes into account that protective
servants earn below average wages and adjusts for the labor share. Doubling security related labor
inputs would only lower multifactor productivity by about half a percent. This effect is most likely
still an overestimation of the actual effect of homeland security. Not only because the assumption
that the private sector would double the number of protective servants, but also the fact that not all
protective servants employed in the private sector are protecting private sector businesses. Some of
them are providing security services to the government and consumers. Furthermore, many of them
are employed to guard against other things than potential terrorist attacks.
Doubling the number of installed electronic security systems will only lower productivity
(MFP) by about 0.15% in the business sector and will have virtually no effect on manufacturing
productivity levels. Finally, the effect of doubling security related service inputs in manufacturing
will lower MFP by about a tenth of a percent.
In sum, doubling all inputs that are directly related to security in the business sector will most
likely lower multifactor productivity by 0.8% or less and labor productivity by at maximum 1.13%.
This estimated effect is of a similar magnitude as that reported by the CEA. The Council estimates
that the homeland security efforts will reduce output over 5 years by 0.6% relative to the level that it
would have been without the efforts. The CEA’s calculation does not only include the shift in
productivity estimated in this section. It also includes the effect of a decrease in expected
investment, and therefore in the future capital stock, due to this downward shift in productivity. It is
important to realize, however, that it might take some time before the productivity effect calculated
here takes effect. Firms need time to implement their additional security measures.
Although the scenario chosen here is comparable with that used by the CEA, the hypothetical
doubling of security related inputs is chosen rather arbitrarily. Hence, this choice begs the question
how likely it is that firms will actually double their security related inputs. One way to look at this is
to compare the cost of this doubling with the $10 billion of private sector homeland security costs
estimated by O’Hanlon et. al. (2002). Doubling the number of protective servants in the business
sector alone would already cost more than $25 billion annually at 2000 wage levels. Add to this the
$102 billion replacement value of the electronic security systems in place in the U.S., measured in
2000 dollars, and it is obvious that the implementation costs of the scenario of doubling the security
related inputs vastly exceed the estimated homeland security costs estimated for the private sector
by O’Hanlon et. al. (2002). Thus, the estimates presented here are best interpreted as an upperbound
on the impact of homeland security on private sector productivity.
What is the magnitude of the 1.12% drop in labor productivity? The most straightforward way
to look at this is to ask, at the current input levels, how much output could the workers that are
assigned to homeland security have produced in measured output. That is, suppose that there would
have been a 1.12% increase in hours that was used for productive purposes, by what amount would
business sector output have increased? Output of the business sector in 2001 was about $860012
billion. Increasing the labor input by 1.12% would have added about $70 billion to this. About twice
as much as the federal government plans to spend on homeland security in the 2003 fiscal year.
Two critical remarks about the above analysis are necessary at this point. First of all, the growth
accounting exercise performed here assumes that the relative productivity and prices of the various
inputs stays the same. If the homeland security efforts would have a big effect on the economy then
they would likely affect prices as well and the above analysis would be less useful. However, since
the results suggest that the effect will be rather small, it is unlikely that prices will change in such a
drastic manner that they significantly affect the results.
Secondly, the aviation security bill discussed in some more detail in the next section will shift a
large part of the responsibility for airport security from the private to the public sector. This shift in
itself might lead to an increase in private sector productivity, because it takes off a large chunk of
unproductive overhead costs from the private sector’s payrolls and capital expenditures. The efforts
of companies to let the FBI take over some of their employee screening, see the Wall Street Journal
(February 6, 2002), would have a similar effect.
Overall, the conclusion of this section is that the estimated effects of homeland security on
productivity are rather small. Because the results presented here are likely to overestimate these
effects, the actual effects on private sector productivity are most likely going to be even smaller.13
4. Indirect effects of homeland security measures
In principle, the homeland security efforts of the public and private sectors could possibly have
many indirect effects on the economy. Claims of all these effects are to some extent rather
speculative. In this section, I will focus on the two effects that have gotten the most attention in
recent months. The first is the possibility that the tightening of airport security will increase waiting
times at airports. The second is the fear that homeland security will draw away resources from R&D
and lower the rate of technological change, lowering the outlook for long-run productivity growth.
Aviation security effects
Part of the proposed homeland security budget, $4.8 billion to be precise, is to be spent on the
improvement of aviation security. The 2001 Aviation and Transportation Security Act led to the
instatement of a new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) which will be responsible for
the screening of passengers and baggage. At the heart of the legislation is the federalization of
airport security, which involves the federal government hiring 30,000 airport security workers to
perform passenger as well as baggage screenings.
Additional to the hiring of federal security personnel, the law also provides funding for the
purchase of equipment necessary to screen all checked baggage for explosives, as well as for
strengthening cockpit doors and more air marshals on flights.
All these costs are already accounted for in the direct cost estimates for the public sector of
section 1. However, there is a major
concern that tightening security at
airports will significantly increase
the amount of time that passengers
will end up waiting at the airport
before boarding their flight.
Navarro and Spencer (2001), for
example, argue that the bulk of the
costs of increased aviation security
will be due to this additional
waiting time.
They claim that the cost of these
delays is between $8 billion and
$32 billion annually. Their
calculation is based on the
assumption that about 550 million
passengers will spend an additional
90 minutes in the airport before
boarding their flights and that their
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Figure 4. Estimated security check wait times
at 10 major airports
Source: Delta Airlines
Note: Data are for May 16
th 200214
time is worth between $10 to $40 an hour.
Using more detailed data yields an estimate of the cost of increased airport delays which is on
the lower end of the range reported by Navarro and Spencer (2001).
First of all, the estimate that increased security will lead to a 90 minute delay per passenger
probably exaggerates the time-loss. Poole (2001) already observed that the new security standards
imposed are not much higher than those in major international airports around the World. This
would suggest that airport waiting times in the U.S. should become similar to those in other
countries. Delta Airlines has started publishing expected airport wait times for curb side check-in,
ticketing, and security checks. Figure 4 shows the estimated wait time for security checks in ten of
the major airports in the U.S. on May 16, 2002. None of these wait times exceeded 60 minutes
during peak hours and all of them were 15 minutes or lower during off-peak hours. Hence, it seems
more reasonable to assume that the average passenger faces an extra hour of waiting due to
increased security standards. This will be the scenario on which the following calculation is based.
Note that, given the data in Figure 4 this still seems a rather high increase, which implies that the
estimate presented here can again be considered an upperbound.
There are two types of flyers. The first
are business travelers. The time they spend
at the airport is measured as labor input and
thus an increase in their waiting time
affects productivity. The second are leisure
travelers, who fly on their own time which
is not accounted for as a productive input.
Let’s start with the business travelers
first. Based on the data provided by the
Travel Industry Association of America
(TIA,2000), one can estimate that of the
636 million passengers boarding a plane in
1999, a bit more than a third were business
travelers. The same data by the TIA
suggest that the average annual household
income of these business travelers was
$76,100, contrary to the mean of $55,000
for the U.S. population. Hence, this would
have led to a loss of about 215 million
productive hours. When we assume that all
these business travelers were employed in
the non-farm business sector, then this
would have been a loss of 0.09% of the
total hours input and 0.12% of the wage
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Figure 5. Total hours of delay, due to increased airport
delays and road congestion
source:  Air Transportation Association of America, 2001 Annual
report. Texas Transportation Institute, Urban Mobility Study
2001
note: All data for 1999. ‘Additional airport waiting time’ is assumed
to be 1 hour per 1999 revenue passenger.15
adjusted labor input for the non-farm business sector in 1999. The productivity effect of such a loss
is listed in Table 2.
Suppose that leisure travelers will also spend an additional hour waiting. Their waiting time,
however, is not a productive input and, as such, does not affect productivity. In its calculation of the
cost of traffic congestion the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) (2000) valued an hour in 1999 to
be $12.40. Hence, if we would value the hours lost by leisure travelers due to an additional hour of
waiting time in 1999, then their lost time would be worth $5.3 billion. Add to this the value of the
time lost by the business travelers, which would be about $6.4 billion, then the total value of this
time lost would have been $11.8 billion. This is slightly lower than the $12.5 billion regional cost of
congestion in the Los Angeles area, estimated by the TTI. Figure 5 compares the loss in hours due
to increased airport security with the 10 regions with the biggest time loss due to traffic congestion.
This $11.8 billion is also on the lower end of the range $8 billion to $32 billion range reported by
Navarro and Spencer (2001).
Besides the fact that the assumed additional 60 minutes of waiting time are rather long, there are
two other reasons because of which these results might be overestimating the cost. First of all,
contrary to time spent in traffic congestion, time spent waiting at airports can be used for other
activities, like shopping, dining and working. This is especially true for business travelers, who can
use cellphones and computers to get some work done anyway. Secondly, if business travel becomes
a big hassle then firms will probably reduce their number of business trips, as they have done right
after September 11
th 2001. Though such a substitution effect would reduce the lost time waiting in
airports, it would also have a negative effect on output because of reduced demand for many of the
services used by business travelers.
Long-run productivity effects
The above analysis suggests that the homeland security efforts will have a small effect on the level
of productivity. Could they also affect our outlook for the growth of productivity? Right after the
September 11
th 2001 attacks, BusinessWeek (2001) suggested that the homeland security efforts
might indeed have a long-run effect on economic growth.
Evidence from many recent economic studies, like those by Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) as well
as Oliner and Sichel (2000), suggests that the engine of the growth spurt of the economy in the late
1990’s has been the unprecedented investment levels, especially in computers and related
equipment. The innovations in computer-technology underlying these investments are driven by
research and development programs. Hence, if the homeland security efforts reduce the R&D
expenditures associated with these technologies then this might lower the productivity growth rate.
There are two main channels through which private sector R&D might be affected by homeland
security. First of all, homeland security related R&D might crowd out R&D expenditures on
productivity enhancing technologies. Also, if the demand for homeland security related equipment
increases then this might lead to shift in the private R&D portfolio from innovations that improve
output producing technologies to security related technologies that do not produce any measured16
output. Secondly, a decrease in overall productivity will lower the returns to the innovations
obtained from the R&D efforts.
Since the above analysis suggests that the overall productivity effect of the various homeland
security related programs will probably be fairly low, it does not seem a likely deterrent of future
R&D efforts. Hence, the latter channel will probably not be significant.
It is not easy to gauge the magnitude of the first channel. We do not know how much of the
R&D expenditures in the private sector will be shifted from improving computers and other inputs
that yield measured output to improving security systems. What we do know is what the federal
government proposes to spend on R&D related to homeland security. The 2003 budget includes ‘…
an aggressive $2.4 billion research and development program to develop technologies that will
strengthen our [the U.S.’s] bioterrorism response capabilities’ (OMB, 2002).
The $2.4 billion proposed additional R&D spending is relatively small compared to total R&D
spending in the economy. In 2000, the U.S. public and private sectors spent about $265 billion on
R&D. Defense R&D was $24 billion, or about 9% of this total. Even when one would add the
currently proposed $2.4 billion of bioterrorism response R&D to this $24 billion, then one would
find that defense R&D spending would have been only 10% of total R&D spending in 2000. This
would be almost the lowest level since the National Science Foundation started collecting data on
defense R&D expenditures in 1972. Hence, the proposed R&D expenditures are not likely to be of
such a magnitude that they impede private sector R&D initiatives.
Other indirect effects
In principle, one can come up with many more possible indirect effects of homeland security on the
economy. One concern has been that increased uncertainty about their supply and distribution
channels as well as their demand would induce firms to target higher inventory levels. Since
inventories levels have dropped a lot in the fourth quarter of 2001, preliminary evidence seems to
suggest that this is not the case.
Another concern is that increased costs of trade might hamper trade and growth, see Worldbank
(2001) and OECD (2001) for example. Though some anecdotal evidence suggests that costs of trade
have increased in the aftermath of September 11
th 2001, there is no conclusive evidence whether
this increase is permanent. In fact, Andrea and Smith (2002) provide evidence that right after
September 11
th 2001 the Ontario-Michigan border crossing times increased significantly but that by
December 2001 these times had gone back to levels that did not impede car manufacturing by
disrupting logistical channels.
The problem with all of these concerns is that their quantification is hard and speculative. For
that reason, they are not dealt with in more detail in this paper.17
5. Conclusion
This paper started with the question ‘What will Homeland Security Cost?’. Based on the evidence
presented we can conclude with the answer ‘not much’.
Homeland security related expenses make up such a small part of the economy that they are
unlikely to have major effects on the fiscal discipline of the government as well as productivity in
the private sector. Proposed government spending on homeland security will account for about
0.35% of GDP in 2003. This is only one-tenth of national defense outlays. Furthermore, homeland
security will, at maximum, reduce the private sector productivity level by 0.8%.
Two things are important to realize about the results presented here. First of all, the results here
do not mean that the damage of the September 11
th 2001 terrorist attacks is negligible. The results
solely focussed on the economic effects of the expenditures made for the prevention of and
preparedness for possible future incidents. Secondly, the results do not suggest that homeland
security is unimportant. The analysis in this paper is essentially only the cost side of a full cost-
benefit analysis. The benefits of homeland security are, unfortunately, not always easy to measure.
One can simply not observe how many terrorist activities have been prevented because of increased
security. Furthermore, it is hard to put a value on the increased sense of safety that the homeland
security program provides for the U.S. population.
What we do know is that, given the relatively small expenses, even if they only prevent one
other September 11 over the next few years, the return on the homeland security expenditures is
likely to be high.18
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Table 1. Share of inputs directly devoted to protective services, in percentages
Sector Employment 
a Wage bill 
a Replacement
value of capital 
c
Capital service
flows 
c
Intermediate
services
Business 1.12 0.71 0.52 0.46 -
Non-farm business 1.13 0.71 0.54 0.44 -
Manufacturing, total 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.76
Durable 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.05 0.92
Nondurable 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.04 0.60
Government 17.26 17.53 0.38 - -
Federal 2.94 2.98
  Police officers 0.63 0.52
  Security Guards 0.13 0.08
State 
b 17.04 16.55
  Police officers 2.15 2.49
  Security Guards 0.29 0.19
Local 25.09 28.32
  Police officers 10.31 12.00
  Security Guards 0.25 0.17
Source: BLS Occupational Employment Statistics (2000), BEA Fixed Assets Tables, Security Sales Magazine, and SIA Research Update (2001-2
nd
quarter)
Note: (a) labor input data are for 2000 and for all workers in protective services occupations, (b) the majority of the protective servants working for state
governments are correctional officers, (c) Protective capital is assumed to consist of Electronic Access Control, anti-burglary, Closed Circuit Television,
and fire protection systems, as well as systems integration and home automation. Data are constructed for 1999.22
Table 2. Effect of homeland security effort on level of productivity, a few scenarios (percentage change)
scenario type of
productivity
Business nonfarm
 Business
manufacturing durables
manufacturing
non-durables
manufacturing
ALP -1.12 -1.13 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
MFP -0.49 -0.49
•  Double security related labor
inputs
MFP-klems -0.06 -0.07 -0.05
ALP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MFP -0.14 -0.15
•  Double security related
capital inputs
MFP-klems -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
ALP
MFP
•  Double security related
business services inputs
MFP-klems -0.10 -0.11 -0.08
ALP -0.06
MFP -0.08
•  Additional airport delays
MFP-klems
ALP -1.12 -1.19 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09
MFP -0.63 -0.71
•  Total effect
MFP-klems -0.17 -0.19 -0.14